This pallet derives the ha.sis of a theory, of communication from a formal theov,.' of rational interaction. The major result is a <h, mon~t fallen t hat. ilh,c,tionary acts need not I)e primitive, and .ee, I uot he reco~'nized..\s a t,'st case. we derive Searle's condit ions on reqt,est in~ from pri,ciples of ralionality coupled with a ~;ric~,an theory of iml~erativ,.s. The theory is shown to distingui.~h insincere or nonserious imperatives from tr~le requests.
propositional attitude expressing the speaker's goal. This attitude becomes true as a result of uttering a sentence with that feature. Because of certain general principles governing beliefs and goals, other causal consequences of the speaker's having the expressed goal can be derived. Such derivations will be "summarized" as lemmas of the form "If (conditions) are true, then any action making (antecedent) true also makes (consequent) true] These lemmas will be used to characterize illocutionary acts. though they are not themselves acts. For example, the lemma called REQUEST will characterize a derivation that shows how a heater's knowing that the speaker has certain goals can cause the hearer to act. The conditions licensing that chain will be collected in the REQUEST lemma, and will be shown to subsume those stipulated by Searle [261 as felicity conditions. However, they have been derived here from first principles, and without the need for a primitive action of requesting.
The benefits of this approach become clearer as other illocutionary arts are derived. We have derived a characterization of the speech act of informing, and have used it in deriving the speech act of questioning. The latter derivation also allows us to disting~tish real questions from teacher/student questions, and rhetorical questions. However. for brevity, the discussion of the.,e speech acts has been omitted.
Indirect speech acts can be handled within the framework. although, again, we cannot present the analyses here. Briefly, axioms similar to those of Perrauh and Allen {22] can be supplied enabling one to reason that an agent has a goal that q, ~iven that he also has a goal p. When the p's and q's are themselves goals of the hearer (i.e.. the speaker is trying to get the hearer to do something), then we can derive a set of lemmas for i,,lirect requests. Many of these indirect request lemmas correspond to what have been called %herr-circuited" implicatures. which, it was suggested [211 underlie the processing of utterances of the form "Can you do X?'. "Do you know y?", etc. l,emma formation and lemma application thus provide a familiar model of-herr-circuiting. Furthermore. this approach shows how one ran use general purpose reasoning in concert with conventionalized b~rms (e.g., how one can reason that "Can you reach the salt" is a request to pass the salt), a problem that has plagnwd most theories of speech acts.
The plan for the paper is to construct a formalism based on a theory of action that is sufficient for characterizing a request. Most of the work is in the theory of action, as it should be.
The Formalism
To achieve these goals we need a carefl:lly worked out (though perhaps, incomplete) theory of rational action and interaction. "!'he theory wil~ be expressed in a logic whose mndet theory is ba.,ed (loosely) on a possible-worlds semantics. We shall propose a logic with four primary modal operators --BELief, BMB, ~,f)AL. and AFTER. W~th these, we shall characterize what agents need to know to perform actions that art, intended to achieve their ~oals. The .zgents do so with Ihe knowledge that other agents operate similarly. Thus, agents have beliefs about .'her'~ gcals, and they have goals to influence others' beliefs and goals. The integration of these operators follows that of Moore {20l, who analyzes how an agent's knowledge affects and is affected by his actions, by meshing a possible-worlds model of knowledge with a situation calculus model of action [18] . By adding GOAL, we can begin to talk about an agent's plans, which can include his plans to influence the beliefs and goals of others.
Intuitively, a model for these operators includes courses of events (i.e., sequences of primitive acts) " that characterize what has happened. Courses of events (O.B.e.'s) are paths through a tree of possible future primitive acts, and after any primitive act has occurred, one can recover the course of events that led up to it. C.o.e.'s can also be related to one another via accessiblity relations that partake in the semantics of BEL and GOAL. Further details of this semantics must await our forthcoming paper
[17].
As a general strategy, the formalism will be too strong. First, we have the usual consequential closure problems that plague possible-worlds models for belief. These, however, will be accepted for the time being. Second, the formalism will describe agents as satisfying certain properties that might generally he true, but for which there might be exceptions. Perhaps a process of non-monotonic reasoning could smooth over the exceptions, but we will not attempt to specify such reasoning here. Instead, we assemble a set of basic principles and examine their consequences for speech act use. Third, we are willing to live with the difficulties of the situation calculus model of action -e.g., the lack of a way to capture tnse parallelism, and the frame problem. Finally. the formalism should be regarded as a de,~eription or specification Bran agent, rather than one that any agent could or should use.
Our approach will be to ground a theory of communication in a theory of rational interaction, itself supported by a theory, of rational action, which is finally grounded in mental states. Accordingly, we first need to describe the_behavior of BEL, BMB. GOAL and AFTER. Then, these operators will be combined to describe how agents' goals and plans influence their actions. Then. we characterize how having beliefs about the beliefs and goals of othe~ can affect one's own beliefs and goals. Finally, we characterize a request.
To be more spe~iflc, here are the primitives that will be used, with a minimal explanation.
4,1 Primitives
Assume p, q, ... are schema variables ranging over wffs, and a, b • • are schematic variables ranging over acts. Then the following are wlfs.
tVffs ~p {p v q}
(AFTEI'~. a p} -p is true in all courses of events that obt,-,in from act a's happening';, (if a denotes a halting act).
(DONI:'. a) -The event denoted by a has just happened.
(AGTa x) -Agent xistheonly agent of act a a ~ b --Art a I)r~cedes act b in the current course of events. 3 z p ,~here p contains a free occurrence of variable z. (UNTIL p a) --iterative action d*~ (~p:a)';~p? (again, as in dynamic logic).
The recta-symbol "1-' will prefix formulas that are theorems, i.e.. that are derivable. Properties of the formal system that will be assumed to hold will be termed Propositions. Propositions will be both formulas that should always be valid, for our forthcoming ~emantics, and rules of inference that should be sound. No attempt to prove or validate these propositions here, but we do so in It 7].
Properties of Acts
We adop! ,In' ,Isual axioms characterizing how complex actions behave .mh'r AFTER, a.s treated in a dynamic logic (e.g., [20] )
namely,
Proposition t Propert*es o/complez aet~ --~ (AFTER (AFTER (AFTER AFTER atttl
ties:
DONE will have ~he following additional proper. Our treatment of acts requires that we deal somehow with the "frame problem" [18] . That is, we must characterize not only what changes as a resuh of doing an action, but also what does not change. To approach this problem, the following notation will he convenient:
Of co.rse, all theorems are preserved.
Temporal concepts are introduced will DONE (for past happenings) and <> (read "eventually'}. To say that p was true at ~(,me point in the past, we use 3a (DONE p?:a). <> is to he regarded in the "branching time* sense [I 1], and will be defined more rigorously in !17]. Essentially, OP is true iff for all infinite extensions of any course of events there is a finite prefix satisfying p. OP and O~p are jointly satisfiable. Since OP starts "now ", the following property is also true, *(AFTER t (DONE t)), where t is term denoting a primitive act (or a sequence of primitive actsl, is ant always true since aft ;~t '~ay change the values of terms (e.g., an election changes the value of the term (PRESIDENT U.S.))
Proposition 7 t-p 30P
Also, we have the following rule of inference: SNotice that (BMB y x p) $ (BMB x y p).
~This definition is not entirely correct, but is adequate for present purposes.
4.3.2

Goals
For GOAL, we have the following properties:
If an agent thinks he has a goal, then he does.
Proposition 13 {BEL x {GOAL x p}} -{GOAL x p} Proposition 14 {GOAL x p} ^ {GOAL x p~q) {GOAL x q)8
The following two derived rules are also useful:
More properties of GOAL follow.
Attitudes and Rational Action
Next. we must characterize how beliefs, goals, and actions are related. "the interaction of BEL anti AFTER will be patterned after Moore's analysis ['20l . In particular, we have:
Agents know what they have done. Moreover, they think certain effects of their own actions are achieved:
The major addition we have made is GOAL. which interacts tightly with the other operators.
We will say a rational agent only adopts goals that are achievable, and accepts as "desirable" those states of the world that are inevitable. To characterize inevitabiJities, we have That is, theorems are believed to be always true.
Another property we want is that no sequence of primitive acts is forever ruled out from happening. A u:~eful instance of ALWAYS Is (ALWAYS pDq) ill which no matter what happens, p still implies q. We can now distinguish between p :~ q's being logically valid, its being true in all courses of events, and its merely being true after some event happens.
SNotice that it pDq is true (or even believed} but (GOAL x pDq) is not true, we should not reach this conclusion since some act could make it laise.
Goals and Inevitabilities
What an agent believes to be inevitable is a goal (he accepts what he cannot change).
Proposition 21 (BEL x {ALWAYS p)) ~ (GOAL x p)
and conversely (almost), agents do not adopt goals that they believe to be impossible to achieve --
Proposition 22 No futility --(GOAL x p) ~(BEL x (ALWAYS ~p))
This gives the following useful lemma:
Proof: By Proposition 21, if an agent believes pDq is always true, he has it as a goal. Hence by Proposition 14, q follows from his goals, This lemma states that if one's goal is ac.o.e, in which p holds, and if one thinks that no matter what happens, pDq, then one's goal is a c.o.e, in which q holds. Two aspects of this property are crucially important to its plausibility. First, one must keep in mind the "follows from* interpretation of our propositional attitudes. Second, the key aspect of the connection between p and q is that no one can achieve p without achieving q. If someone could do so, then q need not be true in a c.o.e, that satisfies the agent's goals. Now, we have the following as a lemma that will be used in the speech act derivations:
The proof is a straightforward application of Lemma I and Propositions 9 and 10.
Persistent goals
In this formalism, we are attempting to capture a number of properties of what might be called "intention" without postulating a primitive concept for "intend". Instead, we will combine acts, beqiefs, goals, and a notion of commitment built out of more primitive notions. To capture ,me grade of commitment than an agent might have towards his goals, we define a persistent goal. P-GOAL, to be one that the agent will not give up until he thinks it has been an:(stied, or until he thinks he cannot achieve it. Now, in order to state constraints on c.o.e.'s we define:
This definition states that p is a prerequisite for x's achieving q if all ways for x to bring about q result in a course of events in which p has been true. Now, we are ready for persistent goals:
Persistent goals are ones the agent will replan to achieve if his earlier attempts to achieve it fail to do so. Our definition does not say that an agent must give up his goal when he thinks it is satisfied, since goals of maintenance are allowed. All this says is that somewhere along the way to giving up the persistent goal, the agent had to think it was true (or belie~,e it was impossible for him to achieve).
Though an agent may be persistent, he may be foolishly so beca,se he ha.~ no competence to achieve his goals. We characterize competence below.
Competence
I'e.ple are ~omet imes experls in certain fiehts, as well as in their own bodily movements. For example, a competent electrician will form correct plans to achieve world states in which "electrical" .-tares of affairs obtain. Most aduhs are competent in achievimz worhl states in which their teeth are brushed, etc. We will say an agent is COMPETENT with respect to p if, whenever he thinks p will tnJe after some action happens, he is correct:
One property of competence we will want is:
Proposition 23 Vx. a (AGT x a) (ALWAYS (COMPETENT x (DONE x a))), where
That is. any person is always competent to do the acts of which he is the agent. ~ Of course, he is not always competent to achieve any particular effect.
Finally. ~iven all these properties we are ready to describe rational agents.
4.5
Rational Agents i~elow are properties of ideally rational agents who adopt per~i.~tent gnals. First. a~ents are carefuh they do not knowingly and deliberately make their persistent goals impossible for them achieve.
Proposition 24 (DONE x act) 2) {DONE x p?;act), where p %'J (P-GOAL x q) ~ ~(DEL x (AFTER act (ALWAYS x ~p))) v ~(COAL x (DONE x act)) l0 in other words, no deliberately shooting onessetf in the foot. Now, agents are cautious in adopting" persistent goats, since they must eventually come to some decision about their feasibility. We require an agent to either come up with a "plan ~ to Sl}ecause of Proposition 2. all Proposition 23 says is that if a competent agen,, believes his own primitiw act halts, it will.
~nNotice *hat tt is eruciad that p be true in ~he sane world in which the agent does act, hence the use ,if "p?;aet*.
achieve them --a belief of some act (or act sequence) that it achieves the persistent goal --or to believe he cannot bring the goal about. That is, agents do not adopt persistent goals they could never give up. The next Proposition will characterize this property of P-GOAL. But, even with a correct plan and a persistent goal. there is still the possibility that the competent agent never executes the plan in the right circumstances --some other agent has changed the circumstances, thereby making the plan incorrect.
[f the agent is competent, then if he formulates another plan. it will be correct for the new circumstances. But again, the world could change out from under him. Now, just as with operating systems, we want to say that the world is "fair" -the agent will eventually get a chance to execl,te his plans. This property is also characterized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 25 fa,r EzecuHon --The agent u,dl prentually form a plan and ezeeute *t. believing it achieves his persistent goal in e,rcumstanees he believes to be appropriate for its sucees.~. Proof sketch:
Since the agent has a persistent goal. he eventually will either find and execute a plan. or will believe there is nothing he can do to achieve the goal. Since he is competent with respect to p, the plans he forms will be correct. Since his plan act' is correct, and since any other plans he forms for bringing about p are also correct, and since the world is "fair', eventually either the agt,nt executes his correct plan, making p true, or the agent comes to believe he cannot achieve p. A more rigorous proof can be found in the Appendix.
This theorem is a major cornerstone of the formalism, telling us when we can conclude •p, given a plan and a ~oal. and is used throughout the speech act analyses. [f an agent who is not COMPETENT with respect to p adopts p a.s a persistent goal, we cannot conclude that eventually either p will be true (or the agent will think he cannot bring it about), since the agent could forever create incorrect plans. [f the goal is not persistent, we also cannot conclude OP since the agent could give it up without achieving it.
The use of ~ opens the formalism to McDermott's "Little Nell* paradox [19l. tt In our context, the problem arises as follows: First, since an agent has a persistent goal to achieve p, and we assume here he is always competent with respect to p, ~p is true. But, when p is of the form Oq (eg., <>(SAVED LITTLE-NELL)), <><>q is true, so <>q is true ~ well. Let us assume the agent knows all this. Hence, by the definition of P-GOAL, one might expect the agent to give up his persistent goal that <>q, since it is already satisfied! On the other hand, it would appear that Proposition 25 is sufficient to prevent the agent from giving up his goal too soon, since it states that the agent with a persistent goal must act on it, and, moreover, the definition of P-GOAL does not require the agent to give up his goal immediately. For persistent goals to achieve <>q. within someone's scope of competence, one might think the agent need "only" maintain <>q as a goal, and then the other properties of rationality force the agent to perform a primitive act.
Unfortunately, the properties given so far do not yet rule out Little Nell's being mashed, and for two reasons. First, NIL denotes a primitive act --the empty sequence, llence, doing it would satisfy Proposition 25, but the agent never does anything substantive. Second, doing anything that does not affect q also satisfies Proposition 25, since after doing the unrelated act, <>q is still true. We need to say that the agent eventually acts on q! To do so, we have the following property:
That is. eventually the agent will have the persistent goal that q, and by Proposif ion 25. will act on it. If he eventually comes to believe he cannot bring about q, he eventually comes to believe he cannot bring about eventually q as well, allowing him to give up his persistent goal that eventually q.
4.6
Rational Interaction
This ends our discussion of single agents. We now need to characterize rational interaction sufficiently to handle a simple reqt,?st. First, we ,.liscuss cooperative agents, and then the effects of uttering sentences.
Properties of Cooperative Agents
We describe agents as sincere, helpful, and more knowledgeable than others about the t~lth of some ~tate of affairs. Essentially, O.,,~e concepts capture (quite ~iml)li,qic) constraints on influegcing ~omeone clse's beliefs and goals, and on adopting the beliefs and goal~ of someone else ~ one'~ own. More refined versions are certainly desirable. Ultimately. we expect such properties of cooperative agents, a.s embedded in a theory of rational interaction, to provide a formal description of the kinds of conversational behavior ~rice [1-t[ describes with his "conversational m;Lxims". First, we will say an agcnt i~ SINCERE with respect to p if whenever his goal is to get someone else to belietpe p, his goal is in fact to get that person to knom p.
dec
Definition tl (SINCERE x p) = (GOAL x (laEL y p)) D (GOAL x (KNOW y p))
An agent is HELPFUL to another if he adopts as his own persistent goal another agent's goal that he eventually do something (provided that potential goal does not conflict with his own I.
Definition 12 (HELPFUL x y) a,¢=
'Ca (BEL x (GOAL y (}(DONE y a))) ^ ~(GOAL x ~(DONE x a)) D (P-GOAL x (DONE x a)) Agent x thinks agent y is more EXPERT about the true of p than x if he always adopts x's beliefs about p as his own. )))))))
The ac: !IMPER speaker hearer 'p] stands for "make p t r~w" Proposition 27 states that if it is mutually known that y is attending to x, is then tile result of uttering an imperative to y to make it the case that y has done action act is that y thinks it is mutitally believed that the speaker*s goal is that y should think his goal is foe y to form the persistent goal of doing act.
We also need to a~sert that IMPER preserves sincerity about the speak,'r's coals and helpfulness. These restrictions c,~uld be loosened, but maintaining them is simpler.
Proposition 28 {PRESERVES [IMPER x y "do y act']
(BMB y x (SINCERE y (GOAL y p)))) Proposition 29 (PRESERVES [IMPER x y "rio y ;Jet'] (HELPFUL y xt) All t ',ricean "feature'-based theories of communication need to acco,mt for cases in which a speaker uses an utterance with a feat'tre, but does not have the attitudes (e.g.. beliefs, and goals) '2llowever, #e can only present the analysis of imperatives here. tall it is not mutually known that y is attending, for example, if the speaker i~ not speaking to an ~udience, then we do not say what the result of uttering an imperative is. usually attributed to someone uttering sentences with that feature. Thus, the attribution of the attitudes needs to be contextdependent. Specifically, proposition 28 needs to be weak enough to prevent nonserious utterances such as "go jump in the lake ~ from being automatically interpreted as requests even though the utterance is an imperative. On the other hand, the formula must be strong enough that requests are derivable.
Deriving a Simple Request
In making a request, the speaker is trying to get the hearer to do an act. We will show how the speaker's uttering an imperative to do the act leads to its eventually being done. What we need to prove is this:
(GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act)))))^ (HELPFUL y x)l?; lIMPER x y "do y act']) : 3 
O(DONE y act)
We will give the major steps of the proof in Fi~lre I, and point In their justifications. The full-fled~'ed proofs are h'ft to Ihe ,,nergetic reader. All formula.s preceded by a * are supposed t,, be Irue just prior to performing the IMPER, are preserved by il. an,I thus are implicitly conjoined to formulas 2 -9. By their placement in the proof, we indicate where they are necessary for making t he deductions.
E~entially. the proof proceeds as follows: If it is mutually known that y is attending to x. and y thinks it i~ mutually believed Ihat Ihe e-conditions hohl. then x's ,lltering an imlwrative to y to do some action results in formula (2) . Since h i~ mutually believed x is sincere about his goals, then (:~) it is miltually believed his goal tndy is that y form a persistent goal to ,Io the act. Since everyone is always competent to do acts of which they are the agent. (.1) it is mutltally believed that the act will eventually be done, or y will think it is forever impossible to do. But since no halting act is forever impossible to do, it is (.3) mutually believed that x's goal is that y eventually do it. Ih, nee, 16) y thinks x's ~oa] is that y eventually do the act. Now, ~ince y is helpfillly disposed towards x, and has no objections Io doing the act. 17) y takes it on as a persistent goal. Since he is alwa.w competent about doing his own arts, 18) eventually it ~ill I,.,Ione or he will think it impossible to do. Again. since it is n(,I f~)rever impossible. (3) he v, ill eventually do it.
W,. have shown how the p,.rforming of an imperative to do an act leads to the act's evemually being done. We wish to create a number of lemmas from this proof (and others like it) to characterize iilocutionary acts.
Plans and Summaries
t Plans
A plan for agent "x" to achieve some goal "q" is an action term ~a" and two sequences of wits ".no', ~Pl".... "pt," and "q0", "qz", ... ~qk" where "qk" is ~q" and satisfying 
h (BEL x (ALWAYS (p~a Ch-t) D q,))) i=l,e....k
In other words, given a state where "x" believes the "pi ~, he will believe that if he does ~a" then "q0" will hold and moreover. given that the act preserves pi, and he believes his making "qi-i ~ true in the presence ofpi will also make "qi* tale. Consequently, a plan is a special kind of proof that I-(BEL x ((Po^.-. A Pk) ~ (RESULT x a q))) and therefore, since There are two main points to be made about the~e corollaries. First of all, since they are theorems, the implications can be taken to be believed by the agent "x" in every, state. In this sense, these wits express general methods believed to achieve certain effects provided the assumptions are satisfied. The second point is that these corollaries are in precisely the form that is required in a plan and therefore can be used as justification for a step in a filture plan in much the same way a lemma becomes a single step in the proof of a theorem.
Summaries
We therefore propose a notation for describing many ~t,.p~ of a plan as a single summarizing operator. A 3ummary consists of a name, a list of free variables, a distingafished free variable called the agent of the summary (who will always be list,,d tirst), an Effect which is a wff, a optional Body which is either an action or a wff and finally, an optional Gate which is a wff. The understanding here is that summaries are associated with agent and for an agent "x" to have summary "u". then there are three cases depending on the body of "u':
I. If the Bodyof "u" is a wff, then I.
2.
Given P27, P3, P4, I (BMB y x (GOAL x (BEL y (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act)))))) A *(BMB y x (SINCERE x (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act))))) (BMB y x (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act)))) ^ *(BMB y x (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y (DONE y act)))} (BMB y x (GOAL x O[(DONE y act) v
4.
(BEL y (ALWAYS ~(DONE y aet)))l)) ^ TX, Plf, 3 ,(BMB y x ~(ALWAYS ~(DONE y act))) 5.
(BMB y x (GOAL x O(DONE y act))) A P160 P20, P8, 4 6.
(BEL y x (GOAL x O(DONE y act))) ^ Def. BMB (HELPFUL y x) T.
(P-GOAL y x (DONE y act)) ^ Def. of HELPFUL, MP • (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y (DONE y act))) 8.
<>[(DONE y act) v (BEL y (ALWAYS ~(DONE y act)})l ^ T1
• ~(ALWAYS ~(DONE y act)) 9.
<>(DONE y act} P20, P8 Q.E.D. llowever, this need not be the ca,~e and different agents could have different summaries (even with the same name). Saying that an agent has a summary is no more than a convenient way of saying that the agent always believes an implication of a certain kind.
7
Summarization of a Request
The following is a summary named REQUEST that captures steps 2 through steps 5 of the proof of Theorem 2.
[REQUEST x y act]: Gate: it) (BMB y x (SINCERE x (GOAL x (P-GOAL y (DONE y act))))) ^ (2) (BMB y x (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y (DONE y act)))) (3) (BMB y x ~(ALWAYS ~(DONE y act)))
Bo~i~.
(BMB y x (GOAL x (BEL y (GOAL x (P-GOAL y {DONE y act))))})
Effect: (BMB y x (GOAL x O(DONE y act)))
This summary allows us to conclude that any action preserving the Gate and making the Bod!/true makes the Effect true.
Conditions (2) and (3) are theorems and hence are always preserved. Condition (1) was preserved by assumption.
Searle's conditions for requesting are captured by the above. Specifically, his "propositional content" condition, which states that one requests a future act, is present as the Effect because of Theorem 2. Searle's first "preparatory" condition --that the hearer be able to do the requested act, and that the speaker think so is satisfied by condition (2). Searle's second prepara* tory condition --that it not be obvious that the hearer was going to do the act anyway --is captured by our conditions on persistence, which state when an agent can give up a persistent goal, that is not one of maintenance, when it has been satisfied.
Grice's "recognition of intent* condition [12, 13] is satisfied since the endpoint in the chain (step 9) is a goal. Hence, the speaker's goal is to get the hearer to do the act hy means, in part, of the (mutual) recognition that the speaker's goal is to get the hearer to do it. Thus, according to Grice, the speaker has meant,,,, that the hearer should do the act. Searle's revised Gricean condition, that the hearer should "understand" the literal meaning of the utterance, and what illocutionary act the utterance "counts as* are also satisfied, provided the summary is mutually known, le
T. 1 Nonserious Requests
Two questions now arise. First, is this not overly complicated? The answer, perhaps surprisingly, is "No'. By applying this REQUEST theorem, we can prove that the utterance of an imperative in the circumstances specified by the Gate results in the Effect, which is as simple a propositional attitude as anyone would propose for the effect of uttering an imperative --namely that it is mutually believed that the speaker's goal is that the hearer eventually do the act. The Bod V need never be considered 16~'he further elaboration of this point that it deserves is outside the ~cope . ot this paper.
unless one of the gating conditions fails.
Then, if the Body is rarely needed, when is the "extra" embedding (GOAL speaker (BEL hearer ...)} attitude of use? The answer is that these embeddings are essential to preventing nonserious or insincere imperatives from being interpreted unconditionally as requests. In demonstrating this, we will show how Searle's "Sincerity ~ condition is captured by our SINCERE predicate.
The formula (SINCERE speaker p) is false when the speaker does something to get the hearer to believe he, the speaker, has the goal of the bearer's believing p, when he in fact does not have the goal of the heater's knowing that p Let us see see how this would he applied for "Go jump in the lake', uttered idiomatically. Notice that it could be uttered and meant as a request, and we should be able to capture the distinction between serious and nonserious uses. In the case of uttering this imperative, the content of SINCERE. p p =((:OAL speaker (P-GOAL hearer (DONE hearer/JUMP-INTO Laker]))).
Assume that it is mutually known/believed that the lake is frigidly cold (any other conditions leading to -,.{GOAL x p) would do as well. e.g., that the hearer is wearing his best suit, or that there is no lake around). So, by a reasonable axiom of goal formation, no one has goals to achieve states of affairs that are objectionable (assume what is "objectionable" involves a weighing of alternatives). ~o, it is mutually known/believed that ~(GOAL speaker (DONE hearer [JUMP-INTO Laket])), and so the speaker does not believe he has such a goal. l'l The consequent to the implication defining SINCERE is false, and because tile result of tile imperative is a mutual belief that the speaker's goal is that the hearer think he has the goal of the bearer's jumping into the lake, the antecedent of the implication is true. Hence, the speaker is insincere or not serious, and a request interpretation is blocked, is
In the case of there not being a lake around, the speaker's goal cannot be that the hearer form the persistent goal of jumping in some non-existent lake. since by the 3/0 Futility property, the hearer will not adopt a goal if it is unachievable, and hence the speaker will not form his g~al to achieve the unachievable state of affairs (that the hearer adopt a goal he cannot achieve). }tence, since all this is mutually believed, using the same argument, the speaker must be insincere.
Nonspecific requests
The ability conditions for requests are particularly simple, since as long as the hearer knows what action the speaker is referring to. he can always do it. He cannot, however, always bring about some goal world. An important variation of requesting is one in which the speaker does not specify the act to be performed; he merely expresses his goal that some p be made true. This will be captured by the action lIMPER y 'p] for ~make p true*. Here, tTThe speaker's expressed goat is that the hearer form t persistent gold to jump in the lake. But. by the /neeitails Coassqasaees lemma, given that a c.o.e, satisfying the speaker's goal also hu the heater's eventually jumping in (since the hearer knows what to do), the speaker's goal is also • c.o.e, in which the hearer eventually jumps in. In the same way, the speaker's goal would also be that the hearer eventually gets wet. I*11owever, we do not say what else might be derivable. The speaker's true goals may have more to do with the manner of his action (e.g., tone of voice), than with the content. All we have done is demoasnurata formally how • hearer could determine the utterance is not to be talteo ~r, face value.
in planning this act, the speaker need only believe the hearer thinks it is mutually believed that it is always the case that the hearer will eventually find a plan to bring about p. Ahhough we cannot present the proof that performing an [IMPER x y "p] will make Op true, the following is the illocutionary summary of that proof: [NONSPECIFIC-REQUEST x y p]:
Gate: (BMB y x (SINCERE x (GOAL x (BEL y (GOAL x (P-GOAL y p)))))) A (BMB y x (ALWAYS (COMPETENT y p))) (BMB y x (ALWAYS ~-7 act' (DONE y q?;act'), where q ~( (BEL y (RESULT y act' p))))
Since the speaker only asks the hearer to make p true. the ability conditions are that the hearer think it is mutually believed that it is always true that eventually there will be some act such that the hearer believes of it that it achieves p (or he will believe it is impossible for him to achieve). The speaker need not know what act the hearer might choose.
On summarization
Just as mathematicians have the leeway to decide which proofs are useful enough to be named a.s lemmas or theorems, so too does the language user. linguist, computer system, and speech act theoretician have great leeway in deciding which summaries to name and form. Grounds for making such decisions range from the existence of ilfocutionary verbs in a particular language, to efficiency. However. summaries are flexible --they allow for different languages and different agents to carve up the same plans differently. ,o Furthermore, a summary formed for efficiency may not correspond to a verb in the language.
Philosophical considerations may enter into how much of a plan to summarize for an illocutionary verb. For example, most illocutionary acts are considered successful when the speaker has communicated his intentions, not when the intended effect has taken hold, This acgues for labelling as Effects of summaries intended to capture illocutionary acts only formulas that are of the form (BMI3 hearer speaker (GOAL speaker p)), rather than those of the form (BMB hearer speaker p) or (BEL hearer p), where p is not a GOAL-dominated formula. Finally, summaries may be formed as conversations progress.
The same ability to capture varying amounts of a chain of inference will allow us to deal with muhi-utterance or muhiagent acts, such as, betting, complying, answering, etc., in which there either needs to be more than one act (a successful bet r.quires an offer and an acceptance), or one act is defined to require the presence of another (complying makes sense only in the presence of a previous directive). For example, where REQUEST captured the chain of inference from step 2 to step 5, one called COMPLY could start at 5 and stop at step 9.
tSRemember, summaries are actually beliefs of agents, and those beliefs need oct be shared.
Thus, the notion of characterizing illocutionary acts as lemmalike summaries, i.e., as chains of inference subject to certain conditions, buys us the ability to encapsulate distant inferences at "one-shot'.
Ramifications for Computational Models of Language Use
The use of these summaries provides a way to prove that various short-cuts that a system might take in deriving a speaker's goals are correct. Furthermore, the ability to index summaries by their Bodies or from the utterance types that could lead to their application (e.g., for utterances of the form "(.',an you do <X> ~) allows for fast retrieval of a lemma tlmt is likely to result in goal recognition. By an appropriate organization of summaries [5] , a system can attempt to apply the most comprehensive summaries first, and if inapplicable, can fall back on less comprehensive ones, eventuMly relying on first principles of reasoning about actions. Thus. the apparent difficulty of reasoning about speaker-intent can be tamed for tile "short-circuhed ~ cases, but more general-purpose reasoning can deployed when necessary. IIowever. the conil)lexities of rea.~oning about others' beliefs and goals remains. ["(}r examllh ", ((;OAL BILL OHAVE BILL HAM-MERI))) and (GOAL BILL <~(HAVE JOHN HAMMERI)) could both be part of a description of Bill's plan for John to get a hammer and give it to him. Such a plan could be triggered by Bill's merely saying "C, et tile ilammer" in the right circumstances, such as when Bill is on a ladder plainly holding a nail. :0 A subsequent paper will demonstrate the conditions under which such reasoning is ~ound.
I1 Concluding Remarks rhi~ i)alier tia.~ demonstrated tilat all illocutionary acts ne,'d ant t),' primitive. At least some can be derived from more basic priuciph.s of rational lotion, and an account of tile propositional attitudes affected by the uttering of sentences wittl decl.'u-ative, interrogative, and imperative moods. This account satisfies a number of criteria for a good theory of illocutionary acts. * Most elements of :he theory are independently motivated.
The ~heory of rational action is motivated independently from any notions of communication. Similarly, the properties of cooperative agents are also independent of communication.
l°Notice thllt molt theoritqt Ot Ipeech gta would treat the above utterance u Bed I I direct request. We do not.
The characterization of the result of uttering sentences with certain syntactic moods is justified by the results we derive for illocutionary acts. as well as the results we cannot derive (e.g.. we cannot derive a request under conditions of insincerity ).
Summaries need not correspond to illocutionary verbs in a language. Different languages could capture different parts of the same chain of reasoning, and an agent might have formed a summary for purposes of efficiency, but that summary need not correspond to any other agent's summary.
The rules of combination of illocutionary acts (characterizing, for example, how mnltiple assertions could constitute the performance of a request) are now reduced to nlles for combining propositional contents and attitudes. Thus, multi-utterance illocutionary acts can be handled by accumulating the speaker's goals expressed in multiple titterantes, to allow an illocutionary theorem to be applied.
Multi-act utterances are also a natural outgrowth of l|liS approach. There is no rea.~on why one cannot apply mulliple illocutionary sunlniaries tO tile res0ill of utlt, ring a S¢'lllen¢¢'. Those sllmmaries, however, need not ¢'orre~pond Io illoc0f tionary verbs.
The theory is naturally extensible to indirection (to lie argued for hi another paper), to other illoc.tio.ary act, such u questions, commands, informs, a~sertions, and to tile act of referring [gl.
Finally. allllougti illocutionary act rerog'nition may h,, ~lricily unntwcssary, given the complexily of o01r proofs, it is likely to he loser011. I']~s,.nliallv. s01etl rec~l~nilhm would ;lillOlill~ to lh(. application (if ill,lc01tl*lnary Sllnlllllries llleort'nl.~ Io di.~cover the speaker'~ I~(ml(s L
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